Lucas Peterson v. City of Minneapolis

Lucas Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, No. A24-1205 (Minn. 2025).

The Employee worked as a police officer for the City of Minneapolis for 22 years. In 2021, he informed the City he could no longer serve as a police officer due to PTSD and he sought benefits. The City denied liability and the Employee filed a Claim Petition. Following a hearing, the workers’ compensation judge ruled that the Employee was entitled to benefits for a present diagnosis of PTSD. The compensation judge also awarded penalties against the City for frivolous denial of liability. The City didn’t initially rebut the presumption of compensability under 176.011, subd. 15(e) and didn’t investigate the Employee’s claim before denying it. On appeal following oral argument, the WCCA, sua sponte, referred the case back to the compensation judge to determine whether the Employee also suffered from OSTD (other specified trauma and stressor-related disorder), a consequential mental injury, and was entitled to benefits for the OSTD injury. Subsequently, the compensation judge filed findings on the referral and found that the Employee did sustain a consequential mental health condition as a substantial result of the PTSD diagnosis. The WCCA affirmed the compensation judge’s determinations. The City appealed the WCCA’s decision.

The Supreme Court concluded that the finding that the Employee has a present PTSD diagnosis is not manifestly contrary to the evidence and therefore affirmed the WCCA’s decision. The City argued that this case was similar to Chrz, where the Court found that an employee, who was previously but not currently diagnosed with PTSD, wasn’t entitled to benefits. In Chrz, two psychologists testified the employee no longer met the diagnostic criteria. However, here, the Employee’s expert testified the Employee did presently meet the criteria for PTSD under the most recent edition. Therefore, Chrz didn’t control. The City also argued the DSM-TR-5, which the Employee’s expert relied on, was not a new edition of the DSM since it was still the 5th edition. The Court found these arguments were challenges to the factual findings of the compensation judge, which the Court already determined was not clearly unreasonable. Further, the Court noted that a judge’s factual findings must be in relation to evidence offered by another medical professional and not based upon a judge’s own application of the DSM criteria. The Court clarified that it does not endorse any interpretation of the DSM.

Regarding the consequential OSTD injury, the Court reversed the WCCA’s decision and agreed with the City that the issue was moot. They noted that the initial claim petition alleged PTSD. After the Employee’s expert evaluated him, she diagnosed OSTD, so the Employee amended his claim petition add a second claim for a consequential mental injury. But at the hearing before the compensation judge, the expert testified the Employee had a present diagnosis of PTSD. She modified her previous diagnosis of OSTD as “subthreshold PTSD.” Given the OSTD diagnosis was “subthreshold PTSD” and that the WCCA affirmed that the Employee was entitled to benefits for a present diagnosis of PTSD, a decision as to whether the OSTD was a compensable mental impairment was no longer necessary. Thus, the issue was moot.

Finally, regarding the penalty issue, the Court affirmed the 30% penalty for frivolous denial. The City noted the Employee had a history of personal mental health conditions, but the record contradicted the City’s assertions. The City also argued it was unfair to require employers to rebut the presumption within the statutory period of 14 days. The Court dismissed that argument and said they are bound to follow the clear mandate of the statute.

Justices Moore and Thissen concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Moore disagreed that the Employee has a present diagnosis of PTSD based on the DSM-5-TR and agreed with the City that it was not the most recent version. Justice Moore noted the WCCA’s ruling, which the Court affirmed, implicitly endorsed an expansive interpretation of PTSD—one under which an employee’s eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits based on a diagnosis of PTSD could extend beyond the period in which the employee presently meets the diagnostic criteria. Justice Moore opined that Chrz stood for the fact that PTSD can and does resolve over time, however the Court’s ruling and affirmance of the WCCA suggest that PTSD is a permanent or lifetime diagnosis.

Takeaway: The courts seem to be expanding the criteria for which an employee qualifies for a present PTSD diagnosis, which is bad news for employers and insurers. Further, if an employer and insurer cannot rebut the PTSD presumption in 14 days after notice of injury, they will have no choice but to pick up a claim. Otherwise, they will be subject to penalties.