Cindy Ludwig v. Dakota County, No. WC24-6562 (SUPREME COURT. April 22, 2026).
Cindy Ludwig worked for Dakota County, doing full-time clerical work. She typically left for work around 7:30am to arrive at 8:00am. Due to the 2020 pandemic, the County required Ludwig to work from home full-time. So, she took her County-owned equipment home, including: her laptop, monitors, cords, docking station, keyboard, headset, binders, and an office chair.
Eventually, Ludwig’s managers informed her she would be required to return to the office on September 8, 2021. On September 7, 2021, she packed her work equipment in a large plastic bin. The next day, Ludwig planned to leave for work 15 minutes earlier than usual to set up her equipment before starting her workday at 8:00am. At 7:15am, while loading the bin into her van, she fell to the ground, injuring her back. She filed a Claim Petition the matter eventually came before a compensation judge.
Despite the general rule that injuries sustained commuting to and from work are not compensable, Ms. Ludwig argued that her injury qualifies for either the special-hazard or special errand exception.[1] The compensation judge concluded that the special-errand exception did not apply because she returned her equipment to her office as a part of her commute.
Ludwig appeal to the WCCA. The WCCA reversed the compensation judge’s decision, concluding that Ludwig was returning office equipment at the Employer’s implicit request when injured and that there was no evidence that backup equipment was available to her. Thus, the WCCA found that her injury was compensable under the special-errand exception. The County appealed.
On appeal, the Employer argued two things: 1) the Employer did not implicitly request that Ludwig return her equipment to the office before her regular shift started, and 2) Ludwig’s collection and transportation of her equipment does not fall under the special-errand exception.
The Court upheld the WCCA’s finding that the Employer implicitly requested Ludwig to return her equipment before the start of her regular shift as it was not contrary to the evidence. The evidence showed that the Employer expressly directed that she return to the office on September 8, 2021, to begin work at 8:00am, and she did not have backup equipment at the office.
The Court also concluded that Ludwig’s injury was compensable under the special-errand exception. The Court noted it has applied this exception in cases where:
- There is an express or implied request that the service be performed after working hours by an employee who has fixed hours of employment;
- The trip involved on the errand be an integral part of the service performed; and
- The work performed, although related to the employment, be special in the sense that the task requested was not one which was regular and recurring during the normal hours of employment.
The Court found that the first factor favored Ludwig because the County directed Ludwig to return to the office to begin her new hybrid schedule, and implicitly requested that she return all her equipment “before her working hours” to set up her workstation and begin work by her normal worktime. She left earlier than normal to return her equipment, set it up, and begin work. The second factor also favored Ludwig because her trip to her office that day included an errand (i.e., returning her equipment) that was an integral part of the service she performed because she needed her equipment in order to work. Lastly, the third factor favored Ludwig because her task of returning all her work equipment was not a regular one as it would only happen once. Thus, the Court concluded that the injury was compensable under special-errand exception.
Employer argued that Ludwig was simply directed to report to work at a particular place and that it was Ludwig’s decision to bring her equipment. The Court rejected this argument because they found the Employer implicitly requested that Ludwig return her equipment to the office and set it up before she began her shift. This implicit request transformed a directive to report to work at a normal place and time into an errand performed outside normal working hours.
Concurrence
The concurrence opined that that when an employee regularly transports work equipment to work as part of a hybrid schedule, the special-errand exception does not apply because the transportation of her work equipment is part of her regular commute. If the employee transports additional work equipment that will stay at work, the special-errand exception applies if the employee proves it was necessary to bring the equipment back to work.
Takeaway: The special-errand exception applies when an employer expressly or implicitly requires an employee to perform a non-routine task outside normal working hours, and the trip is an integral part of that task. An employer’s directive need not be explicit; an implied requirement can be enough if the employee must complete the task in order to begin work. This case emphasizes that a one-time or unusual assignment related to transporting necessary work equipment can transform an ordinary commute into a compensable work activity.
[1] The special-errand exception allows an employee to receive workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the process of carrying out special mission for the employer.