Rowe v. City of Minneapolis, No. A24-1465 (Minn. 2026).
The Employee, a 25-year old Minneapolis police officer exposed to severe trauma, was initially diagnosed with PTSD under the DSM-5 by Dr. Aleknavicius in March 2022, just days after the publication of the DSM-5-TR. The Employer’s IME doctor, Dr. Young, evaluated the Employee in November 2022 using the DSM-5, concluding that he did not meet PTSD criteria and instead suffered from alcohol use disorder while also criticizing the methodology of the Employee’s initial evaluation. The compensation judge held that the City successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and adopted Dr. Young’s opinion. The judge dismissed the DSM version discrepancy as irrelevant because the underlying PTSD diagnostic criteria remained identical. However, the WCCA reversed, ruling as a matter of law that an Employer can only rebut the PTSD presumption through an Independent Psychological Evaluation (IPE) using the most recently published edition of the DSM, thereby excluding Dr. Young’s opinion and finding the presumption unrebutted.
The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA’s decision and clarified the statutory framework under Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) and (e). First, the Supreme Court agreed with the WCCA that the statutory phrase “the most recently published edition of the [DSM]” unambiguously encompasses text revisions like the DSM-5-TR, making it the governing publication at the time of Dr. Young’s evaluation. However, the Court rejected the WCCA’s determination that an IPE based on the current DSM is the exclusive method by which an employer can rebut the statutory presumption. The statute requires only that an employer demonstrate “substantial factors” or “substantial proof to the contrary,” which can be established through various evidentiary means, including expert critiques highlighting flaws or inconsistencies in the Employee’s diagnosis, medical record audits, evidence of fabrication, or competing medical opinions without strictly requiring a formal IPE.
Importantly, the Supreme Court held that a compensation judge is not barred as a matter of law from considering an employer’s IPE simply because it relied on an outdated DSM edition. Under Minn. Stat. § 176.411, subd. 1, evidentiary rules are relaxed in workers’ compensation proceedings, and an expert’s reliance on a prior DSM edition goes to the probative weight of the opinion rather than its admissibility. While an evaluation using an outdated DSM may carry less weight if diagnostic criteria have materially changed, it still has probative value when the criteria are identical or where it directly challenges a diagnosis rendered under that same prior edition. Because Dr. Young’s opinion provided competent evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the compensation judge’s finding, the WCCA erred in excluding it. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and remanded the case for consideration of the Employee’s two unaddressed alternative arguments regarding the foundational adequacy of Dr. Young’s opinion and potential entitlement to benefits for the interim period between March and November 2022.