Rodney Bjornson v. McNeilus Cos., Inc., No. A24-0454 (Minn. 2025)
The issue before the court was whether the Employee’s attorney presented sufficient evidence to prove that he recovered an ascertainable dollar amount of medical benefits for the Employee under the Roraff fee statute.
Regarding the facts of the underlying case, the Employee suffered two injuries while employed by McNeilus. He received treatment for his injuries at Mayo Clinic. McNeilus paid the Employee’s Mayo Clinic expenses out of a self-funded health insurance plan managed by UnitedHealthcare. In a stipulation for settlement, the Employer and Insurers agreed the Mayo Clinic treatment was causally related to the work injury. The Employer and Insurers agreed that they would “defend, indemnify, and save and hold Mr. Bjornson harmless from any claim for reimbursement or subrogation by Mayo Clinic” and “UnitedHealthcare.” The settlement noted that United had paid $327,257.37 in medical benefits to Mayo. The settlement expressly reserved the issue of whether the Employee’s attorney was entitled to Roraff fees.
The Roraff fee statute in effect at the time of the injuries capped fees at 20 percent of $130,000, or $26,000 per injury. The Employee’s attorney filed a statement of attorney fees with OAH seeking recovery of Roraff fees and argued that the $3,000 in contingency fees under the settlement were inadequate to compensate him. He claimed an ascertainable dollar amount of medical benefits of $327,257.37—the amount he claimed United paid Mayo Clinic. Because of the two dates of injury, he argued for $52,000 in fees, which minus the contingency fees, would be $49,000 in additional fees. At the fee hearing, the Employee’s attorney offered Exhibit G, a document he had created titled “Employee’s Itemization of Benefits Claimed,” which summarized the Mayo bills United had paid. The Claim Petition was also offered as Exhibit D, since attached to the Petition was another copy of the “Employee’s Itemization of Benefits Claimed.” However, the actual bills themselves were never offered into evidence due to a mistake. The compensation judge received Exhibits D and G into evidence. The Employee’s attorney also testified at hearing that United paid $327,257.37 in benefits and that Exhibit G was an itemization of those benefits.
The compensation judge found that United did pay Mayo Clinic an ascertainable dollar amount and awarded $49,000 in Roraff fees. The Employer and Insurers appealed. The WCCA concluded that since the actual itemized bills from Mayo on which the comp judge relied were not in the appellate record, there was a “paucity of evidence” regarding the ascertainable benefits, so the court reversed the award of Roraff fees. However, the WCCA did not analyze whether the record evidence, including the Employee’s attorney’s testimony and exhibits, were otherwise adequate to support the comp judge’s findings.
The Supreme Court noted that the WCCA was required to determine whether “in the context of the record as a whole, [the findings of the compensation judge] are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Lagasse v. Horton. The Court found the WCCA did not do this and did not consider whether a reasonable person would find the remaining evidence in the record, including the Employee’s attorney’s testimony and exhibits, adequate to support the comp judge’s conclusion. Due to this error, the Supreme Court reversed the WCCA’s decision and remanded to the WCCA for further proceedings.
Takeaway: On appeal, the court is required to take the record as a whole and determine whether the comp judge findings are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. This further demonstrates that a comp judge’s findings receive substantial deference and are thus hard to overturn.